The Firing of Bismarck
The focus in this essay is on how Bismarck dealt with the various
forms of internal opposition encountered, and how successful he was with his measures.
When Otto F�rst von
Bismarck-Sch�nhausen became the first Chancellor of the German Reich in 1871, his
position was undisputed. The German people saw in him their national hero who had made
possible the formation of a kleindeutsch German Reich, established by an
overwhelming victory in the 1870/71 war against France. For the first three to four years
after the unification, Bismarck's prestige did not descend from its peak as French
war-indemnity payments caused a boom for the German economy and public opinion was still
caught up in national ecstasy over Bismarck's achievements. However, in the mid-1870s
three factors worked together in removing the chancellor from his superior position and
putting him under political pressure. Firstly, recession set in caused by the end of
French war-reparations. The temporary abundance of capital had not been used efficiently
by German industrials, and their success declined rapidly with the absence of French
capital. Parallel to these economic problems evolved the discontent of the working class
with the living conditions they had to succumb to under Bismarck and Wilhelm I. They gave
their support mainly to the Social Democratic Party (SPD) with the hope for social reforms
and the establishment of trade unions. Thirdly, Bismarck's Kulturkampf against German
Catholics was met by the public with discontent and alienated many of his supporters. The
focus in this essay is on how Bismarck dealt with the various forms of internal opposition
encountered, and how successful he was with his measures.
The constitution of the German
Reich was a bastion of strength for Bismarck. Even though it was designed to give the
impression that power was shared equally between the emperor and the chancellor, Bismarck
had the upper hand in all crucial decision making as he was adept at convincing Wilhelm of
the correctness of his policy. Being responsible only to the Kaiser himself, Bismarck's
policies were not threatened by the Reichstag which had relatively little influence.
"It had the power to initiate debate upon any point of his policy, but neither he nor
any other minister was responsible to the assembly for his actions" (T. A. Morris,
p116). The only issue where the Reichstag could inflict severely on Bismarck was the
alteration of the military budget, for this decision was, according to the constitution,
in the hands of the Imperial Assembly. However, because of fear of the emergence of
another constitutional conflict like the one that was resolved by Bismarck in 1862, its
members agreed from 1874 to 1881 to approve the budget envisioned by Bismarck. Any other
decisions that had potential to conflict with the chancellor were not likely to even be
made, as 17 out of the 58 deputies were Prussian, and thereby predominantly inclined to
favor a pro-Bismarckian policy. These factors indicate how it was almost impossible for an
opposition to block the way of Bismarck, who did not have to seek the
consent of anybody but the easily convinced Emperor.
Nevertheless it seemed favorable
to Bismarck, who was not member of any party himself, to be supported by a strong grouping
in the Reichstag. From 1871 to 1878, a period frequently described as his liberal era,
Bismarck sought cooperation with the National Liberals. These were broadly sympathetic to
the chancellor because he had brought about national unity, the party's major policy aim,
and also because many short-term goals of the two partners coincided - most notably
"consolidation of that national unity and the centralization of the administration of
the Reich" (Morris, p118). However, the collaboration was by no means a complete
symbiosis. In 1874, for example, Bismarck's Press Law enabled for easier prosecution of
editors by the government; a law very much opposed to liberal ideals. The National
Liberals never received from the chancellor any immediate political power; a fact that
lets the collaboration appear more like exploitation at the hands of Bismarck. His
association with the National Liberals strengthened his position by giving him a strong
presence in the Reichstag, and can therefore be seen as a preventive means of dealing with
internal opposition.
Perceived by Bismarck as a threat
to the integrity of the German Reich was the German Catholic minority. Several reasons may
have contributed to the chancellor viewing this group and its political extension, the
Center Party, as a dangerous source of opposition. Firstly, the Catholics had proven to be
opposed to the liberal policy which coated Bismarck up to 1878. Also, they were under the
moral influence of the Pope and therefore did not seem to be reliable subjects of the
Kaiser. Probably their greatest misfortune was that their views and policies were not
acceptable to Bismarck. To combat these Reichsfeinde, "enemies of the people",
Bismarck launched Kulturkampf, the "struggle for civilization", which had at its
core the ambition to annihilate Catholic influence throughout the German Reich. Most
notorious of Kulturkampf were the 'May Laws', a set of laws aimed directly at diminishing
the influence which the German Catholic Church enjoyed. Introduced in 1872 by the Minister
of Religious Affairs, Adalbert Falk, the May Laws brought education entirely under state
control and placed the Catholic Clergy under strict supervision. Catholics in Germany had
to live with the governmental accusation of being enemies of their own fatherland. His way
of dealing with the German Catholics is as a strong indicator of why Bismarck was referred
to as the "Iron Chancellor". His rigorousity in fighting whom he perceived as
his enemy was extreme and lacked any willingness to compromise unless circumstances forced
him to do so.
By 1878, Bismarck had sensed the
general discontent of many highly influential groups within the Reich. Public opinion
demanded protective tariffs to strengthen endangered industrial ambitions, and as a
result, the chancellor's tendency to liberalism was openly challenged. Bismarck reacted
with the second of his two most remarkable features - second to his rigor was only his
opportunism. He conducted a dramatic change from liberalism to conservatism, deserting the
too demanding National Liberals and strengthening his own position by succumbing to the
strong demand for conservative politics. Protective tariffs were introduced in 1879 and
Bismarck's position as chancellor was confirmed. During this process, he was also able to
retract his call for Kulturkampf and the bulk of the May Laws established in 1872 - the
clash with the Catholic Church had proven to be a complete failure. Support for the
Catholics and partial outrage at his uncompromising severity had threatened to severely
damage the support he enjoyed and thus forced him to abandon the attempted annihilation of
Catholic influence in the German Reich.
Growing too strong in Bismarck's
eyes was the Social Democratic Party, which he regarded with severe ideological and
personal contempt. The SPD's policies collided with those of conservative Bismarck, who
was eager to ridden himself of the advancing socialists. His opportunity came in 1878,
when two attempts upon the life of the Kaiser enabled him to direct the nation's
patriotism against his political foes. He dissolved the Reichstag to hold fresh elections,
in which those whom he charged with the attempted assassinations were bound to be the
losers. To get rid of socialism once and for all, Sozialistengesetze (anti-socialist
measures) were passed on October 19th 1878. Even though these measures did not ban the SPD
completely, they prohibited the party from meeting and disseminating its doctrine.
Despite his dislike of socialism
and the extreme measures employed to contain the SPD, Bismarck was aware that the demand
for socialist reform was a threat he could not quite as easily eradicate. Most workers had
to live under undeniably dreadful conditions, and when the uproar that had followed the
attempts on the Kaiser's life ended, the workers would present a most dangerous problem.
Bismarck realized that socialism could not be conquered by oppression alone and embarked
on a program of "state socialism" which was to improve the conditions of the
German workers. In 1883, medical insurance and sick pay were introduced, and 1889 saw the
introduction of old-age pensions. Reforms brought about by state socialism were by no
means as advantageous for the workers as similar reforms by the SPD would have been, but
they sufficed to pacify the proletariat and those critics of the chancellor who had blamed
him for disregarding public needs.
Bismarck's way of dealing with
internal opposition during his chancellorship in the German Reich from 1871 to 1890 is
marked primarily by his rigor and opportunism, but also by most adept planning. Already
the constitution prohibited, theoretically, any threat from below to attain too much
influence. With the Reichstag unable to effectively oppose Bismarck, only the Kaiser had
the power to dispose of the chancellor - a threat that, during the lifetime of Wilhelm I,
did not exist due to the predominantly smooth understanding between the two German
leaders. When a threat from below had potential to endanger Bismarck's position, he would
try to nip it in the bud. Examples of his uncompromising severity regarding political
opposition can be seen in the May Laws and the Sozialistengesetze - threats were to be
eradicated promptly and finally. The French politician Emile Ollivier emphasizes this
picture by displaying Bismarck as a "machiavellian and immoral power
politician". Bismarck's undeniably unethical way of treating internal opposition was
replenished by his opportunism. The abrupt change from liberalism to conservatism, the
tacking back of the May Laws and the granting of socialist reforms support the view that
Bismarck did not have a master plan; not even a firm ideological inclination, but did all
he had to in order to remain the effective leader of the German Reich. I identify his way
of dealing with internal opposition with flexibility rather than sole opportunism - while
it has to be admitted that he was unethical in his methods, he was succumbing to the broad
demands of the public only to be able to carry out the foreign politics necessary to
secure the German Reich for the future. By combining rigor with flexibility, Bismarck
effectively kept internal opposition under control between 1871 and 1890. |